Although politocratic communitarian political and legal philosophies have been established participants in academic discourse, it only spilled over to South African shores fairly recently. Similar to other established legal and political peer theories, politocratic communitarianism is particularly critical of the liberal emphasis on the individual’s private moral life, the idea of autonomous individual freedom supported by pre-social rights, and the concept of limited state involvement in private life. This essay investigates the theoretical points of departure, aspects of politocratic communitarianism, and some implications for political and legal life. These implications include the emphasis on community interests to the detriment of individual interests, the transfer of personal responsibility and liability to the community, and the fact that the material distinction between communial relationships of a natural and organisational nature disappears from view. To the extent that politocratic communitarianism appeals to undifferentiated ancient political and legal practices, it reflects a lack of individuation and differentiation regarding the application of law, it has a very limited view of the legally qualified nature of political community, it manifests an inability to distinguish between, and integrate the diverse legal interests in the community, and it lacks recognition of civil rights and liberties as limitations to state competence.